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Abstract
Will economic growth inevitably degrade the environment, throughout development?
This paper presents a simple household-choice framework that emphasizes the tradeoff
between pollution-causing consumption and pollution-reducing abatement expenditures.
The framework yields a simple explanation for Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKCs,
i.e. non-monotonic, upward-turning paths of environment while development continues)
and facilitates analysis of household voting decisions that lead to public regulation of
environmental externalities. Our sufficient conditions, more general than the literature,
make clear that an asymmetric endowment (i.e. positive environmental quality but zero
consumption at zero income) is sufficient for an EKC given standard preferences and a
wide range of abatement technologies. The key is that the MRS leads the household to
prefer not to abate (or to vote for whatever ‘abatement’ implies) at low income levels.
Without the endowment, abatement technologies alone are insufficient for an EKC path.
For a multi-agent setting with externalities, an analogous result is derived in which the
chosen tax rate rises with income and environmental quality at first falls and later rises.
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1. Introduction
Whether environmental quality will inevitably fall during economic development has
spurred immense empirical, theoretical and policy debate. Early empirical analyses
suggested the existence of so-called Environmental Kuznets Curves, or EKCs, i.e.
non-monotonic, U-shaped relationships at an aggregate level between per-capita
income and environmental quality. Thus, environmental quality would rise during
later stages of development.1 To caricature the early literature, such relationships
seemed empirically clear but theoretically puzzling. The puzzle only helped to fuel
debate about the appropriate interpretation of any such relationship: is it evidence
that regulation is unnecessary, or instead of increased regulation as income rises?
This puzzle spawned EKC models, in two groups: 1) external e¤ects among
households are not internalized; and 2) planner or single-household models. The
latter are relevant when degradation features a signi…cant private component2, and
as a foundation for analysis of household voting when externalities are not internal-
ized. For both reasons, this paper is based on a single-household model, in which
any household (even the poorest) has an initial endowment of environmental quality.
In addition to clarity and transparency, this model permits two advances relative
to the literature. First, our EKC su¢cient conditions permit easy evaluation of
whether a given combination of preferences and abatement technologies gives rise
to an EKC. While existing literature has tended to focus either on preferences or on
abatement technologies3, we allow the e¤ect of a given technology to depend upon
the preferences, and vice versa. Second, with our model as a base we can join the
two model categories by modeling voting for regulation by a set of households, i.e.
an explicit mechanism by which externalities can be internalized as incomes rise.
Why join the categories for modeling EKCs? Consider the …rst, often relevant
category: regulations do not exist, households do not fully internalize their e¤ects,
and it is neither surprising nor new that environment can fall with rising income.4
What is hard to explain about an EKC in this setting is how environmental quality
rises with later increases in income. Any actual mechanism must involve households
caring enough about the environment to coordinate and aggregate preferences, such
as through household voting. Thus, insights from household modeling with at least
partial internalization, i.e. the second model category, should be brought to a multi-
agent setting with externalities, i.e. the …rst category. We provide such a model.
Why is this a contribution, given the many planning models already in the
second category? Neoclassical growth models that consider pollution and growth
have provided one approach when externalities are assumed to be internalized, and
1See, for instance, World Bank 1992, Selden and Song 1994, Sha…k 1994, Holtz-Eakin and
Selden 1995, Grossman and Krueger 1995, and more recently, special issues of both Environment
and Development Economics, in November 1997, and Ecological Economics, in May 1998.
2For example, Chaudhuri and Pfa¤ 1998 and 2002 consider empirically how household fuel choice
in Pakistan changes with income, in light of fuels’ e¤ects on indoor air quality, a private good. While
stove emissions have external e¤ects as well, private environmental quality is signi…cantly degraded.
More generally, other forms of degradation of the environment also feature private components, and
there exists signi…cant private provision of environmental abatement in the absence of regulations.
3For instance, Stokey 1998 emphasizes the role of elasticity of preferences, while Andreoni and
Levinson 2001 focuses upon a role for a very particular type of increasing returns to abatement.
4Environmental economics textbooks feature environmentally damaging external emissions that
rise with the scale of production of the polluting good. If regulations or Coasian bargaining do not
lead to internalization, these emissions will surely lower environmental quality as incomes rise.
can provide results similar to ours.5 But they will not easily explain regulatory
choice given heterogeneous voters.6 The dynamic representative agent framework
lacks a realistic political economic mechanism through which degradation might
in reality be reversed. In contrast, household models can yield insights within a
setting of internalization and, as they can be applied in a multi-agent setting in
the presence of externalities, can permit explicit modeling of how environmental
preferences might be aggregated through voting in order to produce regulation.
For each household, our model focuses upon the asymmetric endowment of con-
sumption and environment, i.e. positive environmental quality but zero consumption
at zero income. This is so natural an assumption as to appear obvious. We show
that it is nonetheless crucial. Given standard preferences for consumption and envi-
ronment, such that if households could purchase them separately and independently
both would be normal goods, an endowment is su¢cient for an EKC given a wide
range of abatement technologies encompassing …xed costs and decreasing returns.7
Thus, the model can account for the initial decrease in environmental quality as
income rises and for increasing environmental quality as income continues to grow.
The key intuition is that, given an endowment of environmental quality that
is degraded by consumption, and given convex preferences for consumption and
environment, at low incomes the marginal rate of substitution implies that the
household prefers not to spend to abate the e¤ects of consumption. This results in
a corner solution where no resources are expended on abatement, but consumption
will rise with income. This causes environmental quality to fall with income.
However, as income continues to rise, and the environment is degraded, the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between environmental quality and consumption increases
in favor of the environment, until it is desirable to abate. This moves the household
to an interior solution, in which it both consumes and abates, and for a wide range
of abatement technologies environmental quality will increase with income because
both goods are normal. We provide a condition which determines whether as in-
come gets high enough environmental quality will rise with income. This compares
the change in the marginal rate of substitution as incomes rise to the change in the
marginal rate of transformation implied by the abatement technology.8 As noted,
such a general condition simpli…es consideration of the implications for EKCs of
combinations of whatever preferences and abatement technologies are of interest.
We also demonstrate that this household analytical approach permits explicit
consideration of voting for enviromental policies when externalities exist. For a
5See Plourde 1972, Keeler et al. 1972, D’Arge and Kogiku 1973, Forster 1973, Gruver 1976,
Stephens 1976, Asako 1980, Becker 1982, Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen 1993, John and Pecchenino
1994, Selden and Song 1995, Jones and Manuelli 1995, Stokey 1998, and Chimeli 2001.
6Note that while Jones and Manuelli 1995 features a representative agent at each point in time,
the paper considers the problem of intertemporal collective decisionmaking.
7Such an endowment assumption (which we argue is hard to refute) is implicit in some existing
papers (e.g., John and Pecchenino 1994). However, its truly central role has not been highlighted.
Further, such endowments can be thought of more broadly if we consider not only preferences and
the MRS but also technologies and the MRT (again, our framework easily permits their comparison).
For instance, Chimeli 2001 suggests that an o¤-equilibrium-path ‘endowment’ of capital may exist
for economies in transition and, given that, traces the optimal path of the MRT as income rises.
8This part of the paper signi…cantly generalizes our related work in Chaudhuri and Pfa¤ (1997 a
and b) and Pfa¤, Chaudhuri and Nye 2001. The theoretical analyses they present develop in detail
the case of input substitution as an abatement technology. That case, in turn, corresponds to the
empirical work on “household EKCs” for indoor air quality in Chaudhuri and Pfa¤ 1998 and 2002.
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distribution of households who do not fully internalize their e¤ects, we give the
conditions for the chosen environmental tax rate to be rising with income, after a
low-income range in which no abatement spending is chosen. Thus we provide an
analogous result, which is based on voting, to the EKC without externalities.
Our …nal point is motivated by this issue: what is hard to explain for EKCs, the
rise or the fall of environment, di¤ers by model category. As noted, with externalities
a fall in environmental quality is the default while a rise is harder to explain. We
show that without externalities, though, rising environmental quality is the default.
As long as environment is a normal good, for a wide range of abatement technologies
the Engel curves for environment ought to be positively sloped at all incomes.
However, why environment might fall with income is unclear. The need for an
explicit explanation of this otherwise puzzling fall (in the case of no externalities or,
more relevant, signi…cant regulation leading to internalization) has been overlooked,
as suggested by the main theorem in Andreoni and Levinson 2001 [paraphrases
inserted in brackets]: [assuming consumption and environment are normal goods,
and a particular increasing returns abatement technology] “for any combination of
utility and abatement technology that yields positive pollution [lowers environmental
quality] for some level of income, optimal pollution will eventually decline back to
zero [environmental quality will eventually rise] for some su¢ciently large income.”
As why environmental quality would fall is not speci…ed, we show that lacking
our asymmetric endowment, for standard convex preferences neither the abatement
technologies we consider nor the increasing returns technology in Andreoni and
Levinson accounts for a range of income in which environment is degraded. Hence,
these abatement technologies alone cannot generate EKCs, and an additional explicit
rationale for falling quality, such as our asymmetric endowment, is needed.
Below, Section 2 brie‡y presents our simple model and, retaining its general-
ity, works through to our su¢cient conditions for an EKC. Section 3 adds intuition
through speci…c cases that show the robustness of our endowment-based result to
a range of abatement technologies. It also explores cases of abatement technologies
without an environmental endowment, …nding that even increasing returns is not
su¢cient for an EKC. Section 4 demonstrates that this static household modeling
approach easily accomodates an application to a multi-agent setting with external-
ities, and provides an example with conditions for stronger environmental policy
as incomes rise, and for …rst decreasing and then increasing environmental quality.
Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion and implications for further research.
2. Household Income and Environmental Quality
2.1. Preferences, Abatement Technology and Environmental Quality
A household gets utility from two goods, a marketed consumption good, denoted by
c, and environmental quality, denoted q, so that utility can be written as:
U = U(c; q) (2.1)
where Uc > 0, Uq > 0, and U is concave in c and q. Households enjoy an initial
endowment of environmental quality (q0 ¸ 0) that is degraded by pollution, which
as a byproduct of consumption rises with c. However, the household can choose
to expend resources to “abate” the e¤ects of pollution on the environment, i.e. to
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make consumption less damaging, for instance by using cleaner but more expensive
inputs or by cleaning up pollution already generated. Denoting such expenditures
on environmental investment as e, we write environmental quality as:
q = q(c; e) (2.2)
where qc < 0–environmental quality falls with rising consumption–and qe > 0.
The general household problem, then, is to choose c and e to maximize (2.3)
subject to the budget constraint (2.4) and, since a household can choose to expend
zero resources on either c or e, also the non-negativity constraints (2.5):
U = U(c; q(c; e)) (2.3)
pcc+ pee = y (2.4)
c ¸ 0; e ¸ 0 (2.5)
where y is household income, and pc and pe are, respectively, the prices of c and e.
2.2. Su¢cient Conditions for an EKC
Before providing speci…c results for particularly interesting cases (see Section 3), we
derive general conditions for the two parts of an EKC, i.e. environmental quality
falling with income at low incomes, and rising with income at higher incomes. For
these general results, we start with a few assumptions about preferences:
i) Uc > 0 (ii) Ucc < 0 (iii) Uq > 0 (iv) Uqq < 0 (2.6)
(v) UqqUcc ¡U2cq ¸ 0 (vi) lim
c!0Uc(c; q) = +1 (vii) limq!0Uq(c; q) = +1
We assume further that preferences are such that the demand for both of these
goods, c and q, would be normal if these goods could both be purchased separately
and independently:
(i) UcUcq ¡ UqUcc > 0 (ii) UqUcq ¡ UcUqq > 0 (2.7)
We also make the following assumptions about the relationships between consump-
tion, environmental degradation and the abatement technology:
(i) qe > 0 (ii) qee · 0 (iii) qc < 0 (iv) qcc · 0
(v) qce ¸ 0 (vi) lim
e!0 qe(c; e) = m < +1 (vii) q(0; 0) = q0 > 0 (2.8)
To simplify the notation, we set pc = pe = 1.
Given these conditions, we ask whether an asymmetric endowment (q0 > 0) leads
to a low income range in which nothing is spent on abatement but consumption
occurs, such that environmental quality falls. Also, we examine whether such a
range is followed by one in which consumption and abatement occur, and both rise
with income such that environmental quality also rises, yielding an EKC. Here we do
so for the general model, while in Section 3 we provide speci…c results (for instance
income ranges for environmental quality falling and rising) for some cases of interest.
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2.2.1. No Abatement at Low Incomes
From (2.6, vi), we know the non-negativity constraint on c will never bind, and from
(2.8, i) we know the budget constraint will always bind. Hence we can write the
…rst-order condition for maximization of (2.3) subject to (2.5) and the budget as:
Uc(c; q(c; y ¡ c)) + Uq(c; q(c; y ¡ c))qc(c; y ¡ c) ¸ Uq(c; q(c; y ¡ c))qe(c; y ¡ c) (2.9)
which holds with equality only if e = y ¡ c > 0. On the left is the net marginal
utility from additional consumption, including the marginal disutility from the loss
of environmental quality brought about by additional consumption. The term on
the right represents the marginal utility from additional abatement expenditures.
Let c¤(y) and e¤(y) denote the optimal choices of c and e from the maximization
problem above. Given the above assumptions regarding preferences and technology,
we will show here that there exists by > 0 such that for all y < by:









= qc < 0
To see this, we can by start by de…ning:
g(y) ´ Uc(y; q(y; 0)) + Uq(y; q(y; 0))qc(y; 0)
l(y) ´ Uq(y; q(y; 0))qe(y; 0) (2.10)
For income y, g(y) is the net marginal gain from devoting all income to consumption,
whereas l(y) is the marginal loss from doing so. Di¤erentiation of g and l shows that
(2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) imply that g(y) declines but l(y) increases with y. Further,
since from (2.6, vi) along with (2.8, vi and vii) we know that:
lim
y!0 g(y) = +1 limy!0 l(y) = K < +1
It follows that there exists by > 0 such that:
g(y) > l(y) 8y < by
g(by) = l(by)
g(y) < l(y) 8y > by (2.11)
The result follows from (2.11) given (2.9). Note the crucial role here of the assump-
tion that q0 > 0–without the environmental endowment the three ranges in (2.11)
may not exist. Given the endowment, when y < by the household will not spend
on abatement because the net marginal utility of consumption, taking into account
environmental degradation, is greater than the gain from abatement spending. This
dictates the corner solution in which environmental quality must fall with income.
2.2.2. Rising Consumption and Abatement at Higher Incomes
Here we will show that under assumptions (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8), for all y > by:
0 < c¤(y) < y 0 <
dc¤
dy












­c = Uq(qee ¡ qce)¡ Ucqqe ¡Uqqqe(qc ¡ qe) < 0 (2.12)
­e = Ucc + Ucqqc +Uqc(qc ¡ qe) + Uqqqc(qc ¡ qe) + Uq(qcc ¡ qce) < 0















These expressions indicate that, with rising income, eventually the household will
want to spend on both consumption and environment. Further, we can see that
the expenditures on each will rise with income. The question, then, is whether
the simultaneous increases in pollution-causing consumption and pollution-reducing
abatement expenditures will permit environmental quality to rise with income.
2.2.3. Falling Then Rising Environmental Quality
That the abatement expenditures will rise with income once y > by does not by itself
guarantee that environmental quality will rise with income beyond the thresholdby. Because consumption is rising as well, the increase in e has to be large enough
to o¤set the additional pollution caused by increased consumption. Under what
combinations of preferences and abatement technologies is that likely to occur?
Note that the assumptions we have made thus far are not su¢cient to ensure
environmental quality rising with income. To see that this is the case, by way of
contrast consider …rst the familiar case from basic consumer theory, in which the
marginal rate of transformation (MRT) the consumer faces—i.e., the rate at which
the consumer is able to exchange one marketed commodity for another—is …xed by
exogenously given market prices and hence is independent of the consumer’s income.
In that case simple restrictions on preferences, e.g. of the sort we have imposed, do
su¢ce to guarantee that the demand for these marketed commodities is normal.
We require further assumptions because environment is a non-marketed com-
modity. This implies that the relative shadow price of environmental quality, i.e.
the MRT along the c-q consumption possibility frontier, will generally (though not
always) depend on the household’s income. Whether non-marketed environmental
quality falls or rises with income will, therefore, depend not just on preferences, i.e.
how the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of c for q changes, but instead on how
both the MRS and the MRT change as we move between optima as income rises.
The assumptions we have made so far pin down the changes in the MRS both along
an indi¤erence curve and in moving between indi¤erence curves within a shift to
a new optimum. They also pin down the change in MRT along a given consump-
tion possibility frontier. The proposition below determines what we need to assume
in addition, in order for EKCs to arise, about the change in the MRT in moving
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from one consumption possibility frontier to another within shifts to new optima,
conditional on and speci…cally relative to the change in the MRS.
Proposition 2.1. Let:
MRS(c; q) ´ Uc
Uq
MRT (c; q) ´ qe ¡ qc














< 0 for all y < by where by is implicitly de…ned by g(by) = l(by)
dq¤
dy
> 0 for all y > maxfby; eyg
Proof: That environment decreases with rising income until by , given q0 > 0, follows
from Section 2.2.1. To see that adding (2.13) is su¢cient for there to exist an
income level beyond which environmental quality increases with income, note that


















where ­e and ­c are de…ned as in (2.12). Since (­e+­c) < 0; we have that
dq¤
dy > 0
if and only if (qe­e+qc­c) < 0. Substituting (2.9) and (2.12) above and rearranging:








(qe(qcc ¡ qce) + qc(qee ¡ qce))]

















(qe(qce ¡ qcc) + qc(qce ¡ qee))
and thus we can see directly that:













dy > 0 if and only if [
@MRS(c¤(y);q¤(y))
@c ¡ @MRT (c
¤(y);q¤(y))
@c ] < 0, as the
su¢cient condition in the proposition suggests. If ey < by, then dq¤dy > 0 from the
moment that abatement expenditures are positive. If on the other hand ey > by, then
7
even after households start to spend on abatement, environmental quality may fall
with rising income, although only up to the threshold level of income ey. Beyond
that income level, environmental quality will improve with increases in income.
This result completes the intuition for su¢ciency of an asymmetric endowment
for an EKC (since Section 2.2.1 showed falling environment at low incomes, i.e. the
…rst part of an EKC). In light of (2.13), see that an endowment yields a falling MRS
as the scale of income and consumption rises, because with convex preferences the
marginal gain from consumption falls as consumption rises. Thus, even were the
MRT not to change with scale, given an endowment the conditions would exist for
rising q¤(y) once y is high enough, i.e. for the second part of the EKC. In fact, for
a wide set of technologies the endowment will be su¢cient for an EKC.
This result also permits the direct evaluation of whether a particular combina-
tion of preferences and abatement technologies can be expected to generate an EKC.
Constant returns (unchanging MRT) leaves things to the preferences, such that an
asymmetric endowment yields an EKC. Increasing returns to abatement spending
(e.g. qee > 0, qcc = qce = 0) should help the second part of the EKC, i.e. rising en-
vironment, because raising q through abatement is easier as scale rises with income.
In light of (2.13), note that this makes the change in MRT as scale rises positive.
Thus, as per Proposition 2.1 even if the MRS were unchanged with scale eventually
environmental quality would rise with income, i.e. increasing returns abatement
technologies do help generate the second part of the EKC, rising environment.
As noted earlier, though, without an asymmetric endowment we lack an explicit
story for why environment falls in the low income range, i.e. for the …rst part of
an EKC. Thus, despite its role in raising environmental quality at higher incomes,
increasing returns shifting the abatement MRT is not su¢cient for an EKC.
3. Robustness and Su¢ciency
We now work through several illustrative examples in some detail, for two purposes:
…rst, to demonstrate that an environmental endowment is su¢cient for an EKC
under a broad range of abatement technologies; and second, to show that even in-
creasing returns to abatement is not su¢cient, as without externalities an additional
explicit story is necessary for why environmental quality falls with income.
3.1. The Su¢ciency of Asymmetric Endowments
3.1.1. Constant Returns to Abatement
For a …rst simple but in many ways quite representative general example, we assume
Cobb-Douglas preferences for consumption and environmental quality:
U(c; q) = c®q¯ ®+ ¯ = 1 (3.1)
We assume an asymmetric endowment q0 > 0, i.e. positive environmental quality
but zero consumption at zero income. This is a natural assumption (again, below we
argue that it is hard to see when it is not reasonable, for people who are able to stay
alive and thus face this optimization problem). For simplicity and transparency, we
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specify in (3.2) a class of simple constant-returns abatement functions9:
q = q0 ¡ °c+ ±e °; ± > 0 (3.2)
Given this expression for q, the household chooses c and e to maximize (3.1) subject
to the budget constraint (2.4) and the non-negativity constraints (2.5). This gives
rise to a non-linear programming problem, the …rst-order Kuhn Tucker conditions
of which lead one to consider the following two cases: 1) c > 0; e = 0; and 2)
c > 0; e > 0.10 The …rst case corresponds to a corner solution in which the household
chooses not to abate, but does consume, and thus environment falls with income.




For a household in this income range, the optimal level of consumption will rise with
income (so that pollution will rise with income as well). Since nothing is spent on












While abatement is feasible, at low incomes it is not desirable. The household
devotes all of its resources to consumption (expenditure on consumption, pcc¤, equals
y). If there were no environmental endowment (q0 = 0), though, there would be
no income range in which abatement is zero. It is the asymmetric endowment that
leads to the boundary solution in which environmental quality falls with income.





Under the linear technology in (3.2), the MRT faced by the household does not vary
with income. From Proposition 2.1, we know then that all that matters is whether
the MRS falls with increases in income (and consumption). But with Cobb-Douglas
preferences, which ensure that q is a normal good, this is guaranteed. Hence, even
though consumption (and pollution) will rise with income, the household spends














The derivative of optimal environmental quality with respect to income in these
results conveys that the weight on the environment within the preferences matters.
These results (see 3.5) also con…rm that the asymmetric endowment is crucial. Were
q0 = 0 (i.e., the standard, zero-endowments case in which normal goods are de…ned),
the solution in (3.6) would always obtain. Thus, as normal goods, both consumption
and environmental quality would increase with income at all income levels.
9Note that the input-substitution technology in Pfa¤, Chaudhuri and Nye 2001 is constant
returns. As that paper argues, there are many cases in which input substitution is the relevant
abatement technology. Note also, including as motivation for Section 3.1.3, that the existence of a
cleanest input may imply that at highest incomes environmental quality will again fall with income.
At the highest incomes only the cleanest input is used, and its use rises with income.
10 In all, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions allow for four cases: 1) c > 0; e = 0; 2) c > 0; e > 0; 3)
c = e = 0; and 4) c = 0; e > 0. Given our assumption on preferences (2.7, vi), as long as y > 0 the
non-negativity constraint on c will never be binding, ruling out 3) and 4).
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3.1.2. Decreasing Returns
Since increasing returns to abatement spending was seen above (see discussion of
Proposition 2.1) to support the second part of an EKC (environmental quality rising
with income at higher incomes), and since constant returns to abatement leaves
things to the preferences, it is worth considering whether decreasing returns to
abatement prevents an environmental endowment from leading to an EKC. With
the preferences in (3.1), we know from Section 2.2.1 that the endowment will be
su¢cient for the fall in environmental quality within the low income range. Thus, the
question is whether, with an endowment but also decreasing returns to abatement,
the quality of the environment can still rise with income at higher incomes.
Demonstrating the utility of Proposition 2.1, we can simply check whether a
particular combination of preferences and an abatement technology satisfy the con-
ditions provided there for environmental quality rising with income, once income is
above a given level. Consider, then, (3.1)’s preferences and (3.7)’s technology:
q = q0 + (1¡ exp[°c]) + (1¡ exp[¡±e]) ° > ± > 0 (3.7)
For these speci…cs, all of (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) hold. In terms of (2.13), we have:














¡ ° exp[°c](° ¡ ±) < 0 (3.8)
Thus, given (3.1), the asymmetric environmental endowment remains su¢cient for
an EKC even for the decreasing returns to abatement technologies in (3.7).
3.1.3. Extreme Decreasing Returns to Abatement
Consider again the constant-returns abatement function (3.2), except now add an
extreme diminishing returns component, such that actual abatement, denoted a,
rises with abatement expenditures e only up to emax. After that point, actual





if e · emax
if e > emax
(3.9)
Going from a level of abatement spending that is below emax to one above it, the
marginal abatement per unit of spending decreases discretely from 1 to 0.
The household then maximizes (3.1) subject to (2.4) and (2.5), given the tech-
nology q = q0 ¡ c + a(e), where a(e) is as de…ned in (3.9) (and the ° and ± from
(3.2) are dropped to avoid unnecessary clutter). The optimization problem yields
three active cases: 1) c > 0; e = 0; 2) c > 0; 0 < e < emax; and 3) c > 0; e = emax.
The …rst two cases are essentially identical to the two cases in Section 3.1.1, with
households in the low income range (as in (3.3)) spending nothing on environmental
investment and lowering the quality of the environment as income rises. Those with
higher incomes (as in (3.5), though in this case also bounded above by the expression
in (3.10)) spend on both consumption and environmental investment, and improve
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the quality of the environment as income rises. Thus, the basic EKC result from
Section 3.1.1 is seen to hold with this decreasing returns abatement technology.
The new feature is case 3), which is optimal for the richest households:
y ¸ emaxpe(pe + pc) + q0®pcpe
pe + ¯pc
(3.10)
Although environmental quality is still normal, households cease investing in the en-
vironment through abatement spending because the marginal abatement from envi-
ronmental investment is zero after e exceeds emax. However, consumption continues
to increase with income, such that pollution increases and environmental quality















Thus with decreasing returns to abatement, both poor and rich households can
arrive at corner solutions where environmental quality falls with income because of
a lack of additional abatement e¤ort to o¤set rising consumption. The relationship
between income and environmental quality can then become an “inverted N” or
“sideways S”, as quality decreases, increases, and then decreases again with income.
This is an interesting result at the least because of related …ndings in the empir-
ical literature on EKCs, where some …tted aggregate relationships take this shape.11
Also, such an empirical …nding might even be expected, given a …nite set of feasible
abatement technologies to choose from (as opposed to a technology within which
one can invest continuously in abatement without limit), such that the rich, upon
using only the “cleanest” technology, may not have further scope for abatement.12
3.2. The Insu¢ciency of Increasing Returns
3.2.1. Fixed Costs of Abatement
Now we modify (3.2) again, but instead of facing decreasing productivity of abate-
ment spending on the margin as in (3.9) now a household can choose from two types
of environmental investment: e1, with no …xed cost but a relatively high marginal
cost p1; and e2, with a …xed cost, f > 0, but a relatively lower marginal cost p2.13
Together, these abatement choices ¡!e = (e1; e2) form the simple increasing returns
abatement technology in (3.12), the last part of a q = q0 ¡ c+ a(e) technology:
a(¡!e ) = e1 + e2 (3.12)
11See, for example, Grossman and Krueger 1995 (page 361, Figures 1,3 and 4, and page 369),
Torras and Boyce 1998 (pages 152-3, 157) and Hill and Magnani 2001 (Table 1).
12See Pfa¤, Chaudhuri and Nye 2001 for a formalized theoretical result. One example they
mention is switching among a …nite set of fuels in order to shift the consumption - air quality MRT.
Note also the discussion in Jones and Manuelli 1995 and Torras and Boyce 1998.
13Fixed costs may well exist. Further, lower-marginal-cost options may have higher …xed costs.
Andreoni and Levinson 2001 provides useful evidence that abatement technologies with higher …xed
costs may have lower marginal costs. They cite EPA studies of the emission control from large coal-
…red burners, and they also regress pollution abatement operating costs by industry and by U.S.
state on a measure of the size of the industry’s contribution to gross state product.
11




pcc+ p1e1 + p2e2 + f
if e2 = 0
if e2 > 0
(3.13)
where p2 < p1. The household is also faced with the non-negativity constraints:
c ¸ 0; e1 ¸ 0; e2 ¸ 0 (3.14)
and picks c and ¡!e to maximize (3.1) subject to (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15):
q = q0 ¡ c+ e1 + e2 (3.15)
Assuming that the …rst type of abatement investment (i.e., e1) is not dominated14,
the optimization problem leads one to consider three cases15:
1) c > 0; e1 = e2 = 0; 2) c > 0; e1 > 0; e2 = 0; 3) c > 0; e1 = 0; e2 > 0 (3.16)




For these households, the optimal values c¤ and q¤ are like those for the poorer
households in Section 3.1.1, and so dq
¤
dy here is equal to ¡ 1pc < 0. Thus, this is again
an income range in which environmental quality falls with increasing income (and,
as above, this is an income range which does not exist if q0 = 0).
The c > 0; e1 > 0; e2 = 0 result is optimal for middle incomes16:
q0®pcp1
p1 + ¯pc
< y · q0®pcp2
p2 + ¯pc
+ f (3.18)
The optimal values c¤, q¤, and e¤1 for households in this income range are like those
for the richer households in Section 3.1.1 (substituting e1 for e and p1 for pe). Thus,





> 0, i.e. environmental quality rises with income.






15Consider two non-linear programming problems, one for e2 = 0 and one for e2 > 0. The e2 = 0
problem yields four cases: 1) c > 0; e1 = e2 = 0; 2) c > 0; e1 > 0; e2 = 0; 3) c = e1 = e2 = 0; 4)
c = 0; e1 > 0; e2 = 0. However, given (2.7, vi), such that when y > 0 the non-negativity constraint
on c will not be binding, 3) and 4) are ruled out. The e2 > 0 problem also yields four cases: 1)
c = e1 = 0; e2 > 0; 2) c = 0; e1 > 0; e2 > 0; 3) c > 0; e1 = 0; e2 > 0; 4) c > 0; e1 > 0; e2 > 0. As
above, 1) and 2) are ruled out by (2.7, vi) when y > 0. Also, it is easily shown that once e2 > 0,
i.e. if the …xed cost has been incurred, given p1 > p2 case 4) is ruled out. From both problems
together, then, we are left with the three cases considered in the text.
16The assumption of the condition under which e1 is not dominated, speci…ed earlier, ensures



















> 0, and environmental quality rises with income. While
q rises in both the middle and the highest income ranges, because p2 < p1 the
derivative of environmental quality with respect to income is greater for the higher
income range. Note, then, that the transition between environmental investments,
which raises the …xed costs but lowers the marginal cost of abatement, discretely
increases the rate at which environmental quality rises with income.
In any case, these results further demonstrate the robustness of the endowment-
based EKC result, for an increasing returns technology. More importantly, though,
they show the insu¢ciency of the increasing returns abatement technology on its
own. If q0 = 0, the income range in (3.17) vanishes, and environmental quality
always rises with income, as the middle income range in (3.18) becomes simply
y < f , and the high income range in (3.19) becomes y ¸ f . As dq¤dy > 0 for
both ranges, we can see that without the asymmetric endowment the quality of the
environment will rise with income for all incomes, i.e. there will not be an EKC.
To consider the validity of the asymmetric endowment, note the results when
even e1 has a …xed cost, but there is no endowment. If a household is rich enough
(given this …xed cost) to both consume and abate, then outcomes are as just de-
scribed: the income range in (3.17) vanishes and environmental quality rises with
income. However, until that point, the household neither abates nor consumes.
Thus, a starving household will choose not to consume because of the implications
for the environment. In our minds this is so generally unrealistic, when thinking
of actual low-income households, as to lead us to seek the source of the lack of
relevance of the result. Our conclusion is that households would be dead at q = 0.
Thus, the almost-starving household (low c due to low y) in which people can stay
alive and consume (given that many die of, e.g., lack of potable water) clearly has
an endowment of environmental quality, e.g. water to drink and air to breathe.
3.2.2. ‘Explosive’ Increasing Returns to Abatement
Andreoni and Levinson posit a particular increasing returns abatement technology
which depends upon consumption directly. Their speci…cation of the technology
q = q0¡c+a assumes q0 = 0 and an a(c; e) where ac > 0; ae > 0, and a is homogenous
of degree k where k > 1. We call this ‘explosive’ increasing returns because as the
scale of income and consumption rise, the returns to abatement investments in e
increase ad in…nitum. Their motivating example, however, is small-scale: a broom
can for the same level of e¤ort accomplish more abatement when sweeping up a
quarter inch of dust, e.g., than when sweeping up an eighth of an inch. It may not
be appropriate to generalize from this small scale to unlimited scale.17
17As in the broom example, it may often be the case that rising c increases da
de
near c = 0: no
matter how hard you try (e > 0), vacuuming a clean (c = 0) rug accomplishes nothing (a = 0).
However, often a capacity constraint (given e) may arise well within the relevant scale of c. Consider
a single broom, thought of as a single unit of e spending. A sweep of a clean ‡oor accomplishes
nothing, while a sweep of a ‡oor with a half-inch of dirt accomplishes more than a sweep of a ‡oor
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The point here is that this technological assumption cannot by itself generate an
EKC. It implies that as income and c rise, marginal productivity of e also rises. A
given investment in e yields more a. That supports the upward-sloping part of an
EKC, as per Proposition 2.1, but does not substitute for the asymmetric endowment
in explaining (as in Section 2.2.1) the downward-sloping part of an EKC.
Consider a(c; e) = ce. Here ac > 0; ae > 0, and a is homogenous of degree k
where k > 1. The household’s problem is to pick c and e to maximize (3.1) subject
to (2.4), (2.5) and, of course, this speci…cation of a(c; e) and thus also of q(c; e). As
in some of the problems above, the cases to consider are: 1) c > 0; e = 0; and 2)
c > 0; e > 0. The e¤ = 0 result is optimal for poorer households, satisfying:
y ·
p
p2e + 4¯q0®pcpe ¡ pe
2¯
(3.20)
The key point here can already be made, with reference to this expression: with
no environmental endowment (q0 = 0), this income range in which environmen-
tal quality will fall with income (as in (3.4) and (3.11)) simply vanishes. Since
elsewhere environmental quality rises with income (as discussed above, increasing
returns makes this more likely), lacking an endowment this technology does not
generate an EKC. Formally, the e¤ > 0 case is optimal for richer households:
y >
p
p2e + 4¯q0®pcpe ¡ pe
2¯
(3.21)
so that if environmental quality is in fact rising with income within this range, then
for the q0 = 0 case it will always rise with income. And in fact18:
e¤ =












4ype(2¡ ®)¯ + 2ype¯ + ype + p2e
¤





where © = p2e(y¡pe)2 and D = q0®p3epc[¯+p2e] are used to simplify. Without an en-
vironmental endowment, even this ‘explosive’ increasing returns to scale technology
explains only environmental quality increasing with income, not an EKC.
4. Income and Environmental Quality in a Multi-agent Setting
Many environmental amenities are public goods in that the polluting activities of a
household degrade the environment for others. Here we demonstrate the utility of
our static household context by showing how the EKC mechanisms we have shown
with a quarter-inch. But then consider a ‡oor with two feet of dirt, a scale likely to be beyond the
capacity of a single sweep of the broom. At four inches per sweep, e.g., simple division suggests
that it will take six sweeps to eliminate the dirt. But simple division is precisely a statement of
capacity and, by implication, constant returns over large scales. Thus, for a scale of c well beyond
the capacity of the e in question, abatement will become e¤ectively constant returns to scale.
18This is one of two roots of a quadratic equation. It is the one in which a higher environmental
endowment implies lower optimal abatement expenditures (as makes intuitive sense, given the e¤ect
of “free” environment on the MRS and given our previous results, e.g. in Section 3.1.1).
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can carry over to the multi-agent context. This permits explicit consideration of
how externalities might be addressed through choice of government policies.
Consider a situation where the environmental quality that a particular household
enjoys depends not just on its own consumption level c and its own abatement
expenditures e—the situation we have been considering thus far—but also on the
consumption levels and abatement expenditures of other households. Let C denote
the overall, or total, level of consumption in the economy, and E denote aggregate, or
total, abatement expenditures. The environmental quality enjoyed by any household
is then expressed as q = q(C;E) where as before (in (2.8)) we assume that:
(i) qE > 0 (ii) qEE · 0 (iii) qC < 0 (iv) qCC · 0
(v) qCE ¸ 0 (vi) qEEqCC ¡ q2EC > 0 (vii) q(0; 0) = q0 > 0 (4.1)
We assume that household preferences continue to be described by a utility function
U(c; q) satisfying assumptions (2.6) and (2.7). But in addition we assume that19:
¡cUcc
Uc
> 1 for all c (4.2)
When the number of households is large enough that each individual household
ignores the e¤ects of its own consumption and abatement expenditures on envi-
ronmental quality, it is clear that no single household will choose to independently
incur any abatement expenditures. And in that case, in the absence of any collective
choice mechanism, as incomes grow and consumption levels increase environmental
quality will continually and monotonically decline with income.
However, as the literature on local public goods amply highlights, simple voting
mechanisms can provide a way of coordinating individual decisions. We consider
voting on a proportional income tax rate, where it is understood that the proceeds
of the tax will be used to …nance public abatement expenditures.
4.1. Rising Preferred Tax Rates
Imagine that each household calculates its preferred tax rate by solving the following:
max
0·t·1V (t; y) = U((1¡ t)y; q((1¡ t)Y; tY )
where y is the household’s income, t is the proportional tax rate, and Y is aggregate
income. The …rst-order condition for this maximization problem is:
yUc ¸ UqY [qE ¡ qC ]
which holds with equality if t > 0. Let t¤(y;Y; q0) 2 [0; 1] denote the preferred tax
rate of a household with income y. Assumptions (2.6), (2.7), (4.1) and (4.2) imply:
t¤(y;Y; q0) = 0 for all y · by(Y; q0)
19This says that preferences for consumption should be su¢ciently elastic. Then, as incomes and
pollution increase, households will devote a higher share of their incomes to abatement, by voting
for higher proportional income tax rates. Stokey 1998 requires such an assumption for an EKC
even in the single-agent case, given a speci…c abatement technology. We did not require this above.
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where by(Y; q0) is implicitly de…ned by:
byUc(by; q(Y; 0)) = Uq(by; q(Y; 0))Y [qE(Y; 0)¡ qC(Y; 0)]
Furthermore, for y > by(Y; q0), we have that @t¤@y is equal to:
Uc[
(1¡t)yUcc
Uc + 1]¡ Uqc(1¡ t)Y [qE ¡ qC ]
UqqY 2[qE ¡ qC ]2 ¡ 2yY Ucq[qE ¡ qC ] + y2Ucc + UqY 2[qEE ¡ 2qEC + qCC ] (4.3)
This is positive, since the numerator is negative, given (2.6) and (4.2), and the
denominator is also negative, given the assumed concavity of U(c; q) and (4.1).
Hence, the preferred tax rate rises (weakly) monotonically with household income.
4.2. An Illustrative Example
To provide a sense of the sorts of results that this framework can potentially yield,
we work through a simple example in some detail. We assume that (much like in
(3.2), but with aggregate C and E drivers) environmental quality is given by:
q = q0 ¡ °C + ±E °; ± > 0 (4.4)
To keep the analysis especially simple we assume that all N households in the
economy have the same level of household income, y, and that aggregate income is
therefore simply Ny. Household preferences are as described above.
As before, let by(Y; q0), the threshold level of income below which a household
will prefer a tax rate of zero, be implicitly de…ned by:
byUc(by; q0 ¡ °Y ) = Uq(by; q0 ¡ °Y )Y (° + ±) (4.5)
Our assumptions about preferences imply that:
lim
y!0
by(Ny; q0) = +1
lim




Uq(° + ±) + °byUcq ¡ °(° + ±)Uqq
Uc(byUccUc + 1)¡ Y (° + ±)Uqc < 0
As aggregate income (and hence aggregate consumption) falls to zero, by(Y; q0) goes
to in…nity. At the other extreme, as aggregate income goes to in…nity by(Y; q0) falls
to zero and a positive tax rate is preferred by all households with positive incomes.
Between these two extremes by(Y; q0) falls monotonically with aggregate income.
Together, the results in (4.6) imply that there exists a yl de…ned implicitly by:
yl = by(Nyl; q0)
such that for all levels of per-household income y < yl:
y < by(Ny; q0)
t¤(y; Y; q0) = 0
@q(Ny; 0)
@y
= ¡°N < 0 (4.7)
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When per-household income is below yl, the (identical) incomes of all households
are lower than the threshold by(Ny; q0) below which a tax rate of zero is preferred.
Because the preferred tax rate is zero for everybody, there are no tax-…nanced
public abatement expenditures and the only e¤ect of increasing incomes is a rise in
consumption levels and a corresponding decrease in environmental quality.




yUcq¢¡ Uq(° + ±)¡ Y (° + ±)Uqq¢
Uccy2 ¡ 2yY (° + ±)Uqc + UqqY 2(° + ±)2 (4.8)
where ¢ ´ ±t ¡ °(1 ¡ t) represents the direct impact of an increase in aggregate
income on environmental quality given an initial tax rate of t. Inspecting (4.8), we
see that if ¢ < 0, which will be the case at low values of t, the preferred tax rate
for a household rises with aggregate income. Each household recognizes that at the
existing tax rate an increase in aggregate income has a negative net impact on the
environment, and is therefore willing to at least partially o¤set the deterioration in
environmental quality through an increase in the tax rate. Starting from t = 0 at
the threshold yl, the preferred tax rate will rise unambiguously with increases in
income until income reaches an upper threshold yh de…ned implicitly by:




What happens beyond this point—whether the preferred tax rate continues to rise
monotonically or exhibits a more complicated non-monotonic relationship with re-
spect to income—depends on the particular speci…cation of preferences and the
particular values of ° and ±. However, the preferred tax rate cannot fall below the
level in (4.9) as long as per-household income remains above yh.
Turning next to the implications of increases in income on environmental quality,
and keeping in mind that Y = Ny, the relevant expression to consider is:
dq((1¡ t¤)Y; t¤Y )
dy










From (4.3), the …rst term on the right hand side is unambiguously positive. As per-
household income rises, holding …xed aggregate income, households prefer higher tax
rates. And a higher tax rate, by lowering aggregate consumption and increasing pub-
lic abatement expenditures, unambiguously improves environmental quality. But an
increase in per-household income also implies an increase in aggregate income and
the impact of this increase on environmental quality is captured by the second term
on the right. The impact can be decomposed into the direct impact, ¢, and the
indirect impact which is realized through the change in the preferred tax rate in-
duced by an increase in aggregate income. When per-household income is below the
upper threshold yh, the net impact is ambiguous and hence the sign of (4.10) cannot
be determined without further specifying preferences and parameters. However, by
substituting in from (4.8) into (4.10) it is easily veri…ed that once incomes cross the
upper-threshold yh, subsequent increases in per-household (and hence aggregate)
income unambiguously lead to improvements in environmental quality.
Combining this last result with (4.7) we have that, except for an intermediate
region where the relationship between income growth and environmental quality is
17
indeterminate, the overall relationship broadly mirrors the non-monotonic relation-
ship emphasized by the empirical work on environmental Kuznets curves. That is,
there exist two thresholds, yl and yh where 0 < yl < yh such that:
dq
dy
< 0 for all y < yl
dq
dy
> 0 for all y > yh
5. Conclusion
Using a static household-choice framework, this paper provided a simple explana-
tion for Environmental Kuznets Curves (EKCs). The very natural assumption of an
asymmetric endowment (i.e., positive environmental quality but zero consumption
at zero income) is su¢cient to yield an EKC. The intuition is that the MRS between
consumption and environment at low incomes, given the endowment, makes abate-
ment undesirable for households. However, as consumption increases with income
and the endowment is degraded by consumption, this corner solution gives way to
interior solutions in which both consumption and abatement expenditures rise with
income. We provide useful su¢cient conditions on preferences and abatement tech-
nologies that ensure that the increase in abatement expenditures is large enough to
o¤set the increase in pollution caused by increased consumption.
This endowment-based result is robust to a wide range of abatement technologies
of interest, including …xed costs and decreasing returns. Our decreasing returns case,
which also stands in for a …nite set of abatement options, stimulates further scrutiny
of the empirical literature for results other than U shapes. Also, the abatement
technologies themselves do not generate EKCs. The reason is that they do not
generate an income range in which environmental quality falls with income.
Finally, we demonstrated the utility of the household approach by applying our
approach to a setting of externalities and multiple agents who vote for taxation
and environmental spending. We derive an EKC result analogous to our previous
results, in which the tax rate chosen rises with income, after a range in which no
abatement occurs, and environmental quality at …rst falls and later rises.
This area of aggregation of heterogeneous preferences (given whatever abatement
technologies seem most relevant) would appear to merit much additional consider-
ation, given the set of stories now present in the EKC literature. This suggests
additional value to starting with the household model in order to pursue additional
complications within the voting arena, as we plan to do in future research.
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